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What Values for Europe?  
The Ten Commandments 
Michael Emerson* 
 
This policy brief is not to compete with Moses, 
whose Ten Commandments addressed the domain 
of personal morality. Here the concern is for the 
values and system of the European public domain. 
Nor does the present contribution claim 
originality, since it is based on the content of the 
European Constitution. However, Moses also 
provided a clear and concise presentation of his message. 
The European Constitution was meant to do this too, but its 
Ten Commandments are to be found literally all over the 
place in the 481-page document, which is indeed more of a 
bible, open to various interpretations. To be carved into one 
tablet of stone, brevity is required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Constitution does actually devote its Article 
1-2 explicitly to “The Union’s Values”. But this 
turns out to be a disappointing text, with a 
dictionary of words, the whole being rather 
unreadable and very unlike Moses. The text goes 
as follows:  
The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between men and women prevail. 
An attempt to formulate the European Union’s Ten 
Commandments, Moses-style, is offered in the box above. 
These are all either explicit or implicit in the Constitution. 
Let us go through these briefly, one by one. Also added are 
a few words on how other global actors – the US, Russia 
and China – rank on the basis of the same criteria, since this 
could be a guide to the possibilities for harmonious foreign 
policy, or to the difficulties that will have to be managed.   
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The Ten Commandments of the European Union 
1.  Thou shalt be truly democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. 
2.  Thou shalt guarantee the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, labour). 
3.  Thou shalt provide for social cohesion between people, regions and states. 
4.  Thou shalt ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of future generations. 
5.  Thou shalt reject nationalism and favour the multiple identity of citizens. 
6.  Thou shalt assure federative multi-tier governance. 
7.  Thou shalt assure secular governance and favour multi-cultural pluralism in society. 
8.  Thou shalt promote multilateral order in international affairs. 
9.  Thou shalt abstain from threatening or using force against others without just cause. 
10. Thou shalt be open, inclusive and integrative towards neighbours that adhere to the above. 2 | Michael Emerson 
 
The Preamble to the Constitution starts by clearly marking 
out Commandment 1 about democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. Here the US is on the same page. Russia, as 
a member of the Council of Europe, should also be on the 
same page, but in practice it is currently de-democratising 
and performing poorly on the rule of law. China makes no 
pretence of being a Western democracy. 
Commandment 2, ensuring the four freedoms of movement, 
is provided under Article III-130. The US is on the same 
page again. Russia and China would say the same, but in 
Russia for example there remain some residual restrictions 
(propiska  system) on the freedom to choose where to 
reside. 
Commandment 3 about social cohesion – economic, social 
and territorial – can be pulled out of Article 1-3. The US, 
Russia and China would all say they do the same. However 
the US certainly has a more austere regime of social 
security and higher interpersonal inequality, but would 
argue that the EU on the other hand has an unsustainably 
heavy system, and will therefore converge more towards 
that of the US in due course. Russia’s system of social 
security, whether at the interpersonal or interregional 
levels, is in a state of virtual ruin. For China the 
phenomenal rate of economic growth is the mechanism for 
lifting people out of poverty. 
Commandment 4 about sustainable economic development 
for the benefit of future generations comes from Article 1-
3. In practice the Kyoto Protocol represents the EU’s 
leading contribution for trying to save the world from 
global warming. Russia has signed on to this. But the US 
has famously rejected it, while continuing to be the world’s 
most extravagant CO2 polluter. China cites the need for 
economic catch-up as the reason not to join Kyoto at 
present.  
Commandment 5 about the abhorrence of nationalism is 
implicit in the Preamble, where it talks of overcoming bitter 
experiences of the past, and looking forward to a common 
destiny while remaining proud of national identities. This is 
reinforced in Article 1-2 which underlines tolerance, non-
discrimination and pluralism; and in Article 1-10 which is 
explicit about citizenship of the Union adding to national 
citizenship. Nationalism becomes worrying when it invokes 
patriotism to the point of justifying intolerant 
discrimination at home and threatening policies abroad. 
The patriotic political discourse in the US post-9/11 has 
registered a somewhat nationalistic tone. However this is 
quite mild compared to Russian or Chinese nationalistic 
discourse. 
Commandment 6 about multi-tier governance is explicit in 
Title III with its detailed provisions governing the 
distribution of competences between EU and member states 
– between the exclusive competences of the Union, shared 
competences and those where the Union is only providing 
coordinating or complementary action. This is reinforced in 
the enunciation of the principle of subsidiarity in Article 1-
11. The US for its part is one of the classic federal 
democracies. Russia on the other hand is currently de-
federalising, as part of its de-democratising tendency. 
China can be considered as tending towards an asymmetric 
federation, with a variety of regimes, from the extreme case 
of Hong Kong to the substantial degree of autonomy 
exercised by many provinces.  
Commandment 7 about secular governance and multi-
culturalism seems to flow from the reference to pluralism in 
Article 1-2, reinforced by the Preamble’s drawing of 
inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe. The debate during the Convention 
was far more explicit, however, with serious tensions 
arising over whether there should be references to God or 
Christianity. The Pope himself intervened, strongly 
supported by several devoutly Catholic states, including 
Poland. Nevertheless, the weight of opinion in favour of 
uncompromisingly secular governance and on not referring 
to just one religion was evidently strong enough to prevail. 
The US is arguably succeeding better at multi-culturalism 
than the EU, but its secularism is slightly coloured by the 
apparent political influence of Christian evangelist 
movements. Russia is certainly secular and substantially 
multi-cultural, but the relative harmony between 
mainstream Russia and the Volga Muslim communities 
stands in contrast to the deepening conflicts and 
ungovernability of the Northern Caucasus. China is 
officially secular and multi-cultural, but Tibet exemplifies 
authoritarian rather than democratic multi-culturalism.  
Commandment 8 about multilateralism is explicitly 
endorsed by the European Security Strategy adopted in 
2003-04, while the Constitution in Article I-3 commits to 
the strict observance and the development of international 
law. The US is clearly resistant to any multilateral legal 
encroachments on the sovereignty of Congress. Russia’s 
idea of the multilateral order is strongly related to its role as 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, giving it 
exceptional diplomatic leverage to require consensus on 
given issues. Yet Russia’s role in the OSCE and Council of 
Europe today is revealing its limited interest in values-
based multilateralism. China’s position is similar to that of 
Russia. 
Commandment 9 about the use of force is not explicit in the 
texts. There is a normatively neutral remark in the 
European Security Strategy – “we need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when 
necessary robust intervention”. But it is evident enough that 
the EU collectively would not achieve consensus to go to 
war without an indubitably just cause. Individual member 
states may be more willing to go to war where the justness 
of the cause may be more controversial, as Iraq has shown, 
but at the EU level the requirements of consensus to 
undertake forceful action will continue to be very 
strenuous. As for the US, the post-9/11 environment has 
seen a revision of security strategy in the direction 
legitimising pre-emptive action, justified by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction combined 
with the new hyper-terrorism. However the Iraq war was 
highly contested according to ‘just cause’ criteria. Russia 
has shown a continuing inclination towards unprincipled WHAT VALUES FOR EUROPE? THE TEN COMMANDMENTS | 3 
 
pressurising behaviour towards its former Soviet Union 
neighbours, but without threatening war. China openly 
threatens to use military force to take Taiwan, which the 
West does not consider to be a just cause.  
Commandment 10, about an inclusive and integrative EU, 
follows from Article 1-58 of the Constitution, stating that 
the Union shall be open to all European states that respect 
its values. In addition Article 1-57 envisages special 
relationships with neighbouring countries. The ongoing 
enlargement of the EU and its new efforts to develop a 
neighbourhood policy testify to the importance of this 
commitment as a mechanism for extending the EU’s 
values. The US, on the other hand, does not integrate its 
neighbourhood, at least not beyond the limited NAFTA 
initiative in the economic domain. This apparently is 
because its political structure and own demos is too 
strongly formed to make the progressive integration of its 
neighbourhood feasible for either party. Russia wishes to 
re-integrate the former Soviet space to the maximum 
extent, but lacks normative political attractiveness – at least 
to its European CIS neighbours – as recent developments in 
Ukraine have shown. China is developing a Greater China 
concept in east and south-east Asia, but since China is not 
democratic it had to find a different way. This seems indeed 
to develop in practice with a different logic, from the 
bottom up rather than top down, through deepening trade, 
investment and personal relations between mainland China 
and the Chinese diasporas in the region.  
In total what picture do we have of the values of the EU 
compared to the US, Russia and China? A simple count 
shows the US sharing 6 out of 10 of EU values. Russia’s 
showing is very bleak, with unqualified commitment to 
hardly any of the commandments. China is more 
convincing on a few accounts.  
Of course this has so far been an utterly Euro-centric 
approach to matters that are to a degree only subjective 
perceptions, and the rest of the world can indeed claim that 
they have a different value system, without that meaning a 
lesser one. This is a question that we must now dwell on.  
The US parts company from the EU on four accounts: 
lesser commitment to multilateralism in general and to 
sustainable development, a greater preparedness to use 
force, and a lack of an integrative regime for including the 
neighbours. The US certainly can and does make the 
argument that its lesser multilateralism is just a reflection of 
the impracticability of much of the UN system, with its 
membership crowded with so many weak states. It also 
argues that its greater preparedness to go to war is no more 
than facing up to the world’s actual security challenges, 
which the EU runs away from. Finally the US can point out 
that lack of an integrative regime is hardly a lack of values, 
but just a structural political fact. Together these arguments 
are a plausible rebuttal to European sermonising about their 
superior value system.  
That is not an end to the story, however, since there is still 
the question of which system is going to attract more 
support in the world. Whose is the closest to what may 
become the global reference model? The US weaknesses, 
according to our Euro-centric reference, are part of the 
explanation why the US’s international reputation as global 
actor has suffered serious damage under President Bush. 
Polls show this clearly, and the US is obviously 
uncomfortable with it. The message of the second Bush 
administration appears to be softening the anti-
multilateralism at least in diplomatic tone. Whether the Iraq 
war has stiffened domestic political resistance to embarking 
on risky wars is not yet known, with the Iran affair due to 
reveal an answer even this year. The other side of this coin 
is the evident success of EU integrative policies in 
achieving the democratic transformation of the former 
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. President 
Bush makes striking speeches about the cause of global 
democracy, but it is much less clear what the instruments 
are to be. War, as in Iraq, has been too costly and uncertain 
as to its consequences to be presented as a model. 
Elsewhere it is not clear whether the US has any new 
instruments of leverage on authoritarian Arab regimes or 
Putin’s Russia. To round off on a constructive note, 
however, the transatlantic synthesis of the very different 
strengths and slightly different values of the EU and US is 
to exploit these as complementary assets, as maybe in the 
‘good cop, bad cop’ imagery. The ‘good cop, bad cop’ act 
can indeed work in practice, as long as both cops are 
working to the same rule book. 
The very poor Russian performance according to the EU 
system of values poses a different question, namely 
whether the present Russian political regime is sustainable 
alongside that of the EU. Russian political discourse is all 
about the pursuit of Russian national interest, rather than 
‘obeying the West’ as they say happened in the early post-
Soviet years. Maybe Russia can conceivably turn in on 
itself for some years at least, just selling gas to the EU, and 
buying consumer goods and holidays in the sun in 
exchange. But there is also the question of whether 
Russia’s current foreign policy priority, to re-consolidate 
the post-Soviet space, is sustainable. The last two years has 
seen Russia’s diplomacy score one own goal after another, 
as clumsy pressuring of its neighbours drives these states 
even faster in a West European direction. Russia may 
choose for the time being a very different value system for 
its ‘near abroad’ foreign policy, based on a restrained 
realpolitik. It is restrained in the sense that no-one expects 
Russia to invade Ukraine or Moldova to get the leaderships 
it prefers. Yet the combination of clumsy realpolitik 
without a credible threat of invasion is a sure loser. Since 
the neighbours know that they will not be invaded, the 
pressurising only pushes them away even faster. Russia’s 
choice of a categorically divergent value system in its near 
abroad policy, compared to that of the EU, is working 
contrary to its declared national interest.  
These considerations bring us back to the question whether 
the EU’s set of values – the Ten Commandments – is just 
the preference of one region of the world. Or is it more than 
a parochial West European affair, which is gaining 4 | Michael Emerson 
 
increasing weight and recognition as a pre-eminent global 
reference. At least this proposition is now being discussed.  
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